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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
In 1994, Clarence Brown, a/k/a Tishon Brown, was 
convicted in the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of New York of six counts of armed 
robbery. While on supervised release in connection with the 
robbery conviction, Brown was convicted of possession of a 
firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
S 922(g)(1). Following sentencing in the gun possession 
case, Brown pled guilty to violating his supervised release 
by committing the gun possession crime. The District Court 
revoked Brown's supervised release and imposed a 
sentence of incarceration for that violation to be served 
consecutively to the term of imprisonment in the gun 
possession case. Brown now appeals the judgments in both 
cases. 
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I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
On May 25, 1998, at approximately 10:50 p.m., Police 
Officer Michael Hughes of the Camden Police Department 
was dispatched to the 700 block of Clinton Str eet in 
Camden to investigate a missing juvenile report. As Officer 
Hughes testified at Brown's gun possession trial, while he 
was speaking to a woman on the street about the juvenile, 
two black males approached him. "They wer e yelling, they 
were real excited, telling me they saw a guy with a gun over 
at 7th and New. . . . 7th and New or 7th and W ashington." 
"They were very excited very nervous, like they were 
hopping around very . . . ." The men told Officer Hughes 
that a man approximately two blocks away was waving a 
gun at people and threatening to "shoot somebody." Officer 
Hughes accompanied the men along Clinton Str eet in the 
direction of 7th Street. The men kept saying, "he's over 
there" and "he's up there." When they reached 7th Street, 
the two men exclaimed, "He's up there, that's him right 
there." The men pointed out Brown, who was walking 
across 7th Street between Washington and Berkeley 
Streets, approximately one and one-half blocks from the 
location at which the men had said they encounter ed the 
man brandishing the gun. 
 
Officer Hughes observed Brown, clearly illuminated by 
street lamps, approaching and carrying a pistol in his right 
hand. Officer Hughes took cover behind a parked car, drew 
his gun, and radioed for assistance. He order ed Brown to 
drop his weapon. After initially ignoring the command, 
which Officer Hughes repeated twice, Br own dropped the 
gun and complied with the officer's order to lie on the 
ground. Officer Kenyatta Kelly arrived at the scene and saw 
Brown on the ground. Officer Hughes told Officer Kelly that 
Brown had discarded a gun and directed Officer Kelly to 
recover and secure it. Officer Kelly r etrieved the weapon, 
which contained thirteen live rounds of ammunition. The 
ammunition, however, had not been chamber ed and the 
gun's firing pin was subsequently discover ed to be broken. 
Officer Hughes arrested Brown and r ead him his Miranda 
rights. After Brown was booked at the Camden Police 
Department, Officer Hughes drove Brown to the Camden 
County Jail. During the trip Brown spontaneously told 
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Officer Hughes that this was not Brown'sfirst offense and 
asked if he could receive "a lesser char ge." Brown also told 
Officer Hughes that he was sorry he had put Officer Hughes 
"through this." 
 
In light of Brown's prior federal convictions for six counts 
of armed robbery and other convictions for automobile theft 
and possession of a loaded firearm, the gun possession 
case was referred to federal authorities for prosecution. 
Trial was conducted in the United States District Court for 
the District of New Jersey. The jury found Br own guilty of 
the gun possession offense. 
 
When Officer Hughes testified at trial that the two men 
had told him about the man waving the gun and saying he 
was going to shoot somebody, Brown's attor ney objected 
and requested a mistrial. The District Court conducted a 
hearing pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 104 to assess the 
objection. On the following day, the court issued a 
memorandum opinion holding Officer Hughes's testimony 
admissible as an excited utterance exception to the hearsay 
rule. Following the jury verdict, the District Court imposed 
a sentence of 78 months imprisonment, followed by a three- 
year term of supervised release. 
 
Brown's supervised release in the r obbery case had been 
transferred to the United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. S 3605. 
Following sentencing in the gun possession case, Br own 
pled guilty to a violation of his supervised r elease by 
committing the gun possession crime. Brown and the 
government agreed as a condition of the plea that, if 
Brown's gun possession conviction was r eversed on appeal, 
he would be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea for violating 
his supervised release in the robbery case. The District 
Court sentenced Brown to 18 months imprisonment for 
violation of his supervised release, to be served 
consecutively to the term of imprisonment in the gun 
possession case. Brown has appealed in both cases. For the 
reasons stated below, we will affirm in both. 
 
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction over Brown's gun 
possession offense pursuant to 18 U.S.C. S 3231 and over 
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the violation of supervised release in his r obbery case 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. SS 3231, 3583(3) and 3605. We have 
jurisdiction of his appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C.S 1291. 
 
We review the District Court's decision to admit evidence 
for abuse of discretion. United States v. Serafini, 233 F.3d 
758, 768 n.14 (3d Cir. 2000). Our review of the District 
Court's interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence is, 
however, subject to plenary review. Id. 
 
We apply an abuse of discretion standar d in reviewing 
the District Court's rulings on objections to the summation. 
If a challenge to the summation was not raised in the 
District Court, we review for plain err or only. See United 
States v. Wert-Ruiz, 228 F.3d 250, 252 n.1 (3d Cir. 2000). 
In order to demonstrate prosecutorial misconduct under a 
plain error standard, the review must reveal "egregious 
error or a manifest miscarriage of justice." United States v. 
Price, 76 F.3d 526, 530 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
 
A. EXCITED UTTERANCES 
 
The "excited utterance" exception to the hearsay rule is a 
long recognized one. It is incorporated into the Federal 
Rules of Evidence in Rule 803(2) which provides that an 
"excited utterance" is admissible as an exception to the 
hearsay rule as long as it is a "statement r elating to a 
startling event or condition made while the declarant was 
under the stress of excitement caused by the event or 
condition." The applicability of the exception is unaffected 
by the availability or unavailability of the declarant as a 
witness. Fed. R. Evid. 803. The rationale for the excited 
utterance exception lies in the notion that excitement 
suspends the declarant's powers of reflection and 
fabrication, consequently minimizing the possibility that the 
utterance will be influenced by self inter est and therefore 
rendered unreliable. See United States v. Joy, 192 F.3d 
761, 766 (7th Cir. 1999), cert. denied , 120 S.Ct. 2704 
(2000); 2 McCormick on Evidence S 272, at 204-05 (5th ed. 
1999). 
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Although courts' articulations of the elements necessary 
to invoke the exception differ, most agree upon three 
requirements: (i) the occurrence of a startling event or 
condition; (ii) the statement in question must have been 
made while the declarant was under the stress of 
excitement caused by the event or condition; and (iii) the 
statement must relate to the startling event or condition. 
See United States v. Moore, 791 F .2d 566 (7th Cir. 1986). In 
the Third Circuit, we have expanded the r equirements of 
admissibility to include: (i) a startling occasion; (ii) a 
statement relating to the circumstances of the startling 
occasion; (iii) a declarant who appears to have had 
opportunity to observe personally the events; and (iv) a 
statement made before there has been time to reflect and 
fabricate. See United States v. Mitchell, 145 F.3d 572, 576 
(3d Cir. 1998); Miller v. Keating, 754 F.2d 507 (3d Cir. 1985).1 
 
In the memorandum opinion it issued following the Rule 
104 hearing, the District Court carefully applied our four- 
part Rule 803(2) analysis as set forth in Mitchell and Miller 
and concluded that Officer Hughes's testimony about the 
statements of the two declarants satisfied each of the four 
prongs. First, the court held that the two declarants' 
observation of a man wielding a firear m qualified as a 
startling occasion. Significantly, Brown all but concedes 
this point in his brief: "On it's [sic] face, a man waving a 
gun and threatening to shoot people would appear to 
qualify." Second, the District Court found that the 
statements of the declarants to Officer Hughes r egarding 
the man brandishing a gun (Hughes testified that the 
declarants said they "just saw a guy with a gun .. . over 
7th and New, 7th and Washington Street") constituted 
statements relating to the circumstances of the startling 
occasion. Third, the District Court held that the declarants' 
several statements that they had personally seen the man 
with the gun, coupled with their subsequent statements as 
they actually pointed out the gunman ("that's him right 
there") adequately established that the men had the 
opportunity to observe personally the startling event at 
issue. Fourth, the court concluded that because the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. These requirements follow Wigmore's classic formulation. See 6 J. 
Wigmore, Evidence SS 1750-51 (J. Chadbourne rev. 1976). 
 
                                6 
  
declarants appeared to be "very excited," "very nervous" and 
"hopping around," and given that appr oximately one minute 
had passed between the startling occasion and the 
declarants' statements to Officer Hughes (Hughes testified 
that the declarants could have walked from the place they 
had seen the gunman to Officer Hughes's location in 
"maybe a minute"), such statements wer e made without the 
opportunity to reflect and fabricate. 
 
Brown contends, however, that the gover nment failed to 
provide evidence of the startling event other than Hughes's 
discussion of the hearsay statements themselves. This 
argument, however, fails in light of the generally prevailing 
rule that an excited utterance may of itself be sufficient to 
establish the occurrence of the startling event. See Moore, 
791 F.2d at 571 (citations omitted) (dictum). Academic 
commentators tend to agree that the hearsay statement 
itself is sufficient proof of the exciting event without resort 
to independent corroborating evidence, in both theory and 
practice. Most jurisdictions also find the statement in itself 
sufficient.2 Similarly, many courts have held that the 
appearance, behavior and condition of the declarant may 
establish, without other independent evidence, that a 
startling event occurred.3 In addition, the Advisory 
Committee Note to Federal Rule 803(2) describes rulings 
holding the statement itself sufficient as "increasing" and 
the "prevailing practice." See Fed. R. Evid. 803 Advisory 
Committee's Note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 305; 2 McCor mick on 
Evidence S 272, at 206 n.19. Indeed, W einstein's Federal 
Evidence goes so far as to conclude that "hearsay may be 
used as the foundation for [the excited utterance] hearsay 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. See, e.g., Moore, 791 F .2d at 571 (dictum); Industrial Comm'n v. 
Diveley, 88 Colo. 190, 294 P. 532 (Colo. 1930); Johnston v. W.S. Nott Co., 
183 Minn. 309, 236 N.W. 466 (Minn. 1931); State v. Smith, 178 W.Va. 
104, 358 S.E.2d 188, 194-95 (W.Va. 1987) (dicta). But see People v. 
Burton, 433 Mich. 268, 445 N.W.2d 133 (Mich. 1989); Truck Ins. 
Exchange v. Michling, 364 S.W.2d 172 (T ex. 1963). See 2 McCormick on 
Evidence S 272, at 206 & n.17 (5th ed. 1999). 
 
3. See, e.g., Moore, 791 F.2d at 570 & n.1; Wetherbee v. Safety Casualty 
Co., 219 F.2d 274 (5th Cir. 1955); Wheeler v. United States, 211 F.2d 19 
(D.C. Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1019, 74 S.Ct. 876 (1954); 
Stewart v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 137 F .2d 527 (2d Cir. 1943). 
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exception. Any other approach would greatly undermine the 
utility of the exception by causing valuable evidence to be 
excluded." Weinstein's Federal Evidence,S 803.04[2][b], at 
803-21 (2d ed. 2000).4 
 
In light of the volume and persuasiveness of authority 
bearing on the question, we conclude that an excited 
utterance may itself be sufficient to establish that a 
startling event occurred and that the question whether 
corroborating evidence independent of the declaration is 
needed in a given case to establish the occurr ence of such 
an event is committed to the discretion of the trial judge. 
 
Brown also asserts that the government failed to satisfy 
the fourth criterion of the Mitchell test: that the statements 
were made before declarants had time to r eflect and 
fabricate. Brown argues that, because Officer Hughes did 
not know what amount of time had passed between the 
startling event and the men's statements and because 
Hughes did not know if the declarants had come to him 
directly from the location of the event (a distance Brown 
concedes could be covered in approximately one minute) or 
by a more circuitous route, the evidence did not preclude 
the possibility that the two men had sufficient time to 
fabricate their story. 
 
This argument, too, is unavailing in light of applicable 
law and the facts of record. Fed. R. Evid. 803(2) does not 
require that, in order to be admissible, the statement be 
contemporaneous with the startling event, but rather only 
with the excitement caused by the event. The critical 
question in the instant case, therefore, is whether the 
men's report of an armed man likely occurred during the 
period of excitement engendered by their sighting of the 
gunman. In United States v. Tocco, 135 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 
1998), the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir cuit held an 
out-of-court statement properly admitted as an excited 
utterance by a declarant who was "all hyped up" and 
"nervous" even though it was made some thr ee hours after 
the startling event. Tocco, 135 F .3d at 127-28. In United 
States v. Phelps, 168 F.3d 1048 (8th Cir . 1999), the Eighth 
Circuit held the statement of a "visibly distraught" 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Accord Louisell, 4 Federal Evidence 510-11 (1980). 
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declarant admissible as an excited utterance, although the 
statement was made 15 to 20 minutes after the startling 
event. See also United States v. Golden, 671 F.2d 369, 371 
(10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 919, 102 S.Ct. 1777 
(1982) (out-of-court statement admissible as excited 
utterance even though approximately fifteen minutes had 
transpired between the event and the statement). 
 
Under factual circumstances comparable to those here, 
where the temporal gap was only a matter of one or a few 
minutes, courts have often admitted the asserted excited 
utterance. See Territory of Guam v. Cepeda , 69 F.3d 369, 
372-73 (9th Cir. 1995), aff 'd in part, rev'd in part by People 
of Territory of Guam v. Cepeda, 69 F .3d 369 (1995) (citation 
omitted) (statements made "within minutes" of armed 
robbery, where declarants were "quite panicked" were 
properly admitted as excited utterances); United States v. 
Joy, 192 F.3d at 766 (statement that appellant had "waved 
a gun around," made within a few minutes of the incident, 
qualified as excited utterance); United States v. Ladell, 127 
F.3d 622, 23, 625 (7th Cir. 1997) (statements of "hysterical 
woman" to police "within minutes" of 911 call claiming 
appellant had hit her with a gun and threatened to kill her 
held admissible as excited utterances); United States v. 
Bailey, 834 F.2d 218, 228 (1st Cir . 1987) (out-of-court 
statement by "upset" declarant concerning an attempted 
bribe three minutes earlier properly admitted as an excited 
utterance). 
 
In the case at bar, the two declarants' statements to 
Officer Hughes that "they just saw a guy with a gun" and 
that "there's a guy over there with a gun" indicate that the 
startling event was very recent, if not ongoing, at the time 
of the statements. Therefore, even ignoring the fact that 
Officer Hughes found Brown carrying a gun shortly after 
the statements were made, it was entirely reasonable for 
the District Court to infer from the testimony that only a 
short time had passed between the startling event and the 
statements, that the declarants were still visibly in an 
excited state, that their statements thus wer e likely made 
in a state of excitement originating with the event, and 
consequently that their statements were admissible as 
excited utterances pursuant to Rule 803(2). In short, we 
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can find no deficiency in the District Court's application of 
the Mitchell test. 
 
Brown also argues that in admitting the two men's 
statements, the District Court ran afoul of our holding in 
Miller. We do not agree. Although we did state in Miller that 
a party seeking to introduce a statement by an unidentified 
declarant under Rule 803(2) "carries a bur den heavier than 
where the declarant is identified to demonstrate the 
statement's circumstantial trustworthiness," Miller, 754 
F.2d at 510, we also emphasized that "such statements are 
admissible if they otherwise meet the criteria of[Rule] 
803(2)." Id. For the reasons set forth supra, Officer 
Hughes's testimony satisfies all the criteria of that rule, as 
elaborated in Mitchell. 
 
Moreover, the out-of-court statement in Miller was made 
by an unidentified declarant at the scene of an automobile 
accident, assigning blame for the accident to the plaintiff. 
The statement itself did not proclaim the startling event 
and the record was devoid of evidence fr om which the court 
could have inferred that the defendant actually saw the 
accident. See Miller, 754 F.2d at 511. In the present case, 
however, the declarants did in fact claim to have personally 
seen the startling event: a man wielding a gun. Mor eover, 
the declarants are simply stating what they observed. They 
are not giving an opinion, which is what occurs when the 
declarant points a finger of fault for causing the accident. 
For these reasons, we find this case is distinguishable from 
Miller. 
 
Furthermore, even if we did interpr et the "heavier 
burden" for unidentified declarants, established in Miller, to 
require corroboration of the startling event beyond the 
excited utterance itself, the fact that Officer Hughes almost 
immediately came upon Brown, who was visibly carrying a 
gun and who was identified as the gun brandisher by the 
two declarants, provides such corroboration. See United 
States v. Collins, 60 F.3d 4, 8 (1st Cir . 1995) (excited 
utterance regarding appellant's thr eat to shoot the victim 
corroborated when appellant returned shortly thereafter to 
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scene of the threat bearing a loaded gun while declarant 
spoke to a police officer).5 
 
We note also that we have recently addr essed the issue of 
the reliability of a statement by an unidentified informant, 
albeit in a different context. In United States v. Valentine, 
232 F.3d. 350 (3d Cir. 2000), we held that an unidentified 
informant's tip in a high crime area to a law enforcement 
officer that a man wearing a blue sweat top, blue pants, 
and a gold neck chain had a gun, was not to be considered 
unreliable solely because the informant r efused to identify 
himself to the officer. We found the statement sufficiently 
reliable to justify an investigatory stop of the suspect. Id. at 
357. As the Supreme Court has instructed, the question is 
whether the anonymously reported information "should be 
deemed trustworthy in light of the total cir cumstances." Id. 
at 354 (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317 
(1983)). The total circumstances in the pr esent case include 
the facts that the declarants accompanied Officer Hughes 
to the location where they pointed out Br own and that 
Brown was indeed visibly carrying a gun in his hand. 
 
For the above reasons, we conclude that the testimony of 
Officer Hughes concerning the statements of the two men 
was properly admitted into evidence by the District Court 
under the "excited utterance" exception to the hearsay rule.6 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Brown also invokes United States v. Sallins, 993 F.2d 344 (3d Cir. 
1993), to challenge the admissibility of the out-of-court statements. In 
Sallins, however, we were not pr esented with the question whether the 
statements at issue were admissible as excited utterances. That decision, 
therefore, is not relevant to the issue before us. 
 
6. Brown also argues that the err oneous admission of Officer Hughes's 
testimony was exacerbated by Officer Kelly's testimony concerning 
Officer's Hughes's radio report. Officer Kelly testified: "I was on patrol 
in 
that area and I heard Officer Hughes come over the radio that . . . he 
had been told there was a guy walking up the street with a gun." 
Brown's counsel objected to the statements as inadmissible hearsay and 
moved for a mistrial. At sidebar, defense counsel reversed his position 
and conceded that the testimony would be admissible because the 
declarants' statements had been admitted into evidence as excited 
utterances and because Officer Hughes's repetition of the statements 
over the radio would be admissible as a present sense impression under 
Fed. R. Evid. 803(1). Brown's counsel then moved to strike the testimony 
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B. SUMMATION REMARKS 
 
We now consider Brown's contentions r egarding certain 
of the prosecutor's summation remarks. Because Brown 
either failed to object to the comments at trial or lodged 
different objections to them, we can only review the 
comments for plain error. See United States v. Walker, 155 
F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 1998) (pr osecutorial remarks as to 
which no objection is made at trial are r eviewed only for 
plain error); Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). 
 
Brown first objects to the following r emarks of the 
prosecutor during the government's initial summation: 
 
       Two men which he believes came from Edmonds 
       Avenue came out excited, started yelling ther e's a guy 
       with a gun around New Street in the ar ea of New and 
       7th, carrying a gun. He's waving it around. 
 
       What does Officer Hughes do? He testifies, and I'll 
       submit to you there has been no challenge to this 
       testimony, it's uncontested. . . . 
 
At this point, Brown's counsel interrupted the prosecutor 
and objected, claiming that the government was attempting 
to shift the burden of proof to the defendant and asserting 
that the "evidence has been challenged, it's been denied." 
At sidebar, the prosecutor explained that she had intended 
to complete her interrupted remark with the wor ds, "it was 
uncontested that [Officer Hughes] walked down the street." 
The District Court accepted the prosecution's explanation 
and concluded that the remark in its entir ety would have 
constituted "fair comment" on the evidence. The Court also 
noted that it was clear from the charge and Brown's not 
guilty plea that he was contesting the charge and overruled 
the defense objection. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
whereupon the District Court agreed to strike it and instructed the jury 
to "disregard the last answer given by Officer Kelly." In view of defense 
counsel's concession of admissibility of Officer Kelly's testimony, of its 
cumulative nature, see Serafini, 233 F.3d at 770, and of the District 
Court's instruction to the jury to disregar d it, see United States v. 
Newby, 11 F.3d 1143, 1147 (3d Cir . 1993), we find no merit to Brown's 
contention that it exacerbated the prior err or -- which we have held was 
not in fact error. 
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Brown complains on appeal not that the pr osecutor's 
remarks unfairly shifted the burden of pr oof but rather that 
they constituted impermissible commentary on the 
accused's silence. We conclude, however , that prosecutor's 
remarks did not constitute impermissible commentary on 
Brown's decision not to testify at trial. In this case, the 
government did not make a direct comment concerning 
Brown's silence; the only aspect of the summation of which 
Brown now complains is the formulation,"there has been 
no challenge to his testimony, it's uncontested." 
 
We have held that a prosecutor's r emark that any aspect 
of the government's evidence was "undisputed" or 
"uncontradicted" at trial constitutes an impr oper comment 
on a defendant's silence only where "the language used was 
manifestly intended or was of such a character that the 
jury would naturally take it to be a comment on the failure 
of the accused to testify." Bontempo v. Fenton, 692 F.2d 
954, 958 (3d Cir. 1982). Brown has failed to satisfy either 
of these requirements. As the gover nment explained at 
sidebar, the comments in question went only to the 
relatively innocuous fact that Officer Hughes walked down 
Clinton Street before seeing Brown. The trial court had 
every right, in the exercise of its sound discr etion, to credit 
that explanation of the prosecutor's interrupted comments 
to the extent it saw fit. See United States v. Mabry, 3 F.3d 
244, 248 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied , Edwards v. U.S., 511 
U.S. 1020, 114 S.Ct. 1403, abrogation on other grounds 
recognized in United States v. Sheppar d, 219 F.3d 766, 767 
(8th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, ___ S.Ct. ___ (2001). Given the 
fact that the District Court accepted this r easonable 
explanation, we are unable to find that the prosecutor's 
remarks were "manifestly intended" or would "naturally [be 
taken]," Bontempo, 692 F.2d at 958, as a comment on 
Brown's silence. 
 
Brown also asserts that the government's comments 
"necessarily" reminded the jury of the defendant's failure to 
testify at trial. This argument, too, is unpersuasive. The 
claim that a prosecutor's remark necessarily would be 
perceived by a jury as an adverse comment on the 
accused's silence must be assessed in the context of the 
summation as a whole and of the evidence intr oduced at 
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trial. See Byrd v. Collins, 209 F .3d 486, 533 (6th Cir. 2000); 
United States v. Francis, 82 F.3d 77, 78 (4th Cir. 1996). 
Viewed in the context of the entire summation and all the 
evidence introduced at Brown's trial, we cannot agree that 
the government's references to "uncontested" testimony 
necessarily would have been interpreted as a commentary 
on Brown's silence. Particularly given the fact that the 
comment at issue was interrupted and never subsequently 
completed, there is no reason to conclude that the jury 
would have assumed it referred to Br own's failure to testify. 
The jury surely was aware of the numer ous aspects of 
Officer Hughes's testimony that were unchallenged by 
defense counsel over the course of the trial. Furthermore, 
the defense strategy had included numerous attempts to 
impeach government witnesses. Thus it is mor e likely that 
the jury would have understood the prosecutor's references 
to "uncontested" testimony as responses to such 
impeachment attempts rather than as veiled r eferences to 
the defendant's silence. See United States v. Durant, 730 
F.2d 1180, 1184 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 843, 
105 S.Ct. 149 (citations omitted) (jury likely to view 
government's sixteen remarks concer ning unchallenged 
testimony as a response to the impeachment attempt, 
rather than as an adverse comment upon defendant's 
silence). 
 
Brown also challenges certain of the pr osecutor's 
remarks during the government's r ebuttal summation as 
either an attempt to shift the burden of pr oof to the defense 
or improper implicit commentary on the defendant's 
decision not to testify. In rebuttal, the pr osecutor stated: 
 
       Officer Kelly, he sees Officer Hughes after he's got him 
       on the ground with the gun pointed -- Officer Hughes 
       points the gun out and Officer Kelly goes over and 
       retrieves it. 
 
       And you have the defendant's statements. I submit 
       that they're admissions of guilt, ladies and gentlemen 
       of the jury. Have we heard any suggestion of some 
       motive Officer Hughes would have for making up this 
       story? 
 
Examined in context, these remarks clearly do not shift 
the burden of proof or constitute impr oper commentary on 
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Brown's failure to testify. Rather , they simply amount to a 
proper rebuttal argument. During the defense summation, 
Brown's counsel cast doubt upon Officer Hughes's 
testimony that he was unaware until trial that the gun 
recovered at the arrest scene had a broken firing pin, and 
suggested the possibility that "Officer Hughes planted" the 
defective and therefore harmless"gun on him, Mr. Brown." 
In its rebuttal statement, when the prosecutor asked, "Have 
we heard any suggestion of some motive Officer Hughes 
would have for making up this story?", Br own's counsel 
objected and at sidebar accused the government of shifting 
the burden of proof to the defendant. The District Court 
overruled the defense objection, stating, 
 
       I think you opened the door, you called into question 
       Officer Hughes' credibility, suggested he might have 
       planted the weapon, it was a broken weapon. I think 
       this is fair comment and I don't think it shifts the 
       burden. The objection is overruled. 
 
We find no error in the District Court's ruling. Indeed, we 
have at least twice found commentary of this type to 
constitute proper rebuttal material. See United States v. 
Dansker, 537 F.2d 40, 63 (3d Cir. 1976) (prosecutor's 
comments challenging the failure of defense counsel to offer 
an innocent explanation for a suspicious conversation 
involving appellant did not constitute improper commentary 
on appellant's failure to testify); United States v. Adamo, 
534 F.2d 31, 39 (3d Cir. 1976) (pr osecutor's remark during 
summation that "nobody denied" a portion of witness's 
testimony was not an impermissible commentary on 
appellant's silence, but rather an attempt to defend 
witness's credibility after attacks of defense counsel). 
Additionally, we have specifically held that when, as here, 
the defense uses its summation to accuse a gover nment 
witness of framing the defendant, the government may in 
its rebuttal point to the absence of evidence to support 
such an accusation. See United States v. Pungitore, 910 
F.2d 1084, 1124 (3d Cir. 1990). It is our view that the 
government properly did so in the instant case. 
 
Brown's only other argument relating to the prosecution's 
summation concerns the following remarks: 
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       The judge instructed you to use your common sense, to 
       take things in light of your own life experiences. W as it 
       uncontested or did the defendant's case -- did Officer 
       Hughes say Camden police, drop the gun? That's what 
       Officer Hughes testified that he said. 
 
Brown failed to object to these comments at trial. We find 
neither error nor any colorable miscarriage of justice here. 
See Price, 76 F.3d at 530. Indeed, it appears that a mere 
prosecutorial slip of the tongue gave rise to the language to 
which Brown now objects -- language with no discernible 
adverse effect upon the defendant. Read in context, as any 
such comments must be, the prosecutor's use of the phrase 
"Was it uncontested or did the defendant's case --" appears 
to be nothing more than an instance of garbled syntax that 
she immediately corrected with a proper r eference to 
admitted evidence: "Did Officer Hughes say Camden police, 
drop the gun?" We think the Supr eme Court's observation 
in Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 94 S.Ct. 1868 
(1974), concerning challenges to closing ar guments 
particularly apposite to our analysis. Because summations 
 
       are seldom carefully constructed in toto before the 
       event [and] improvisation frequently results in syntax 
       left imperfect and meaning less than crystal clear . . . 
       a court should not lightly infer that a prosecutor 
       intends an ambiguous remark to have its most 
       damaging meaning or that a jury, sitting thr ough 
       lengthy exhortation, will draw that meaning fr om the 
       plethora of less damaging interpretations. 
 
Id. at 646-47. As a general rule, in assessing whether an 
ambiguous prosecutorial remark should be construed as an 
improper comment on the defendant's decision not to 
testify, appellate courts "should not strain to r each the one 
interpretation which ascribes improper motives to the 
prosecutor." United States v. Monaghan, 741 F.2d 1434, 
1437 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1085, 105 
S.Ct. 1847 (1985). In this case, the District Court properly 
declined to do so, as do we. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we find Br own's challenges to 
his conviction in the gun possession case meritless. We will 
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affirm that conviction. For that reason, we will also affirm 
the revocation of Brown's supervised r elease in the robbery 
case. 
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RENDELL, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 
The difficulty I have with the majority's application of the 
excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule in this 
instance stems from the fact that the element of a "startling 
occasion" has not been independently verified but was, 
instead, "proven" by the hearsay statement itself. While the 
majority's view may be "the majority view," that does not 
remove the need for an assessment on a case-by-case basis 
of the appropriate ruling regarding admissibility. The 
unique factual setting presented here r equired a different 
result. 
 
Here, the defense theory was that officer Hughes had 
planted the gun. The only evidence that runs counter to 
that theory is the statement of Officer Hughes, r ecounting 
the statement made by the three unidentified males. No 
other witness saw or heard anything. Officer Hughes' 
statement that he then went and saw the defendant waving 
the gun does not add to the reliability of the hearsay 
testimony; rather, Hughes' testimony that he observed 
Brown with the gun could just as easily be no more than 
an embellishment of a fabrication. Nor does thefinding of 
the gun itself add any element of reliability, because that 
fact is just as compatible with the defense theory that the 
gun was planted as it is with the government's theory that 
Brown possessed it. 
 
The reliability problem in the fact patter n presented is 
thus compounded by the fact that the witness allegedly 
hearing the statement regarding the purported startling 
event is the very person whose credibility is under attack. 
The majority's stamp of approval on Hughes' version of 
events, cloaking it with reliability by ruling it not to be 
impermissible hearsay, seems to hand the gover nment an 
unwarranted bonus.1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Although not an "excited utterance" setting, in United States v. 
Sallins, 
993 F.2d 344 (3d Cir. 1993), we noted the problem created by the absent 
government witness. There, a 911 tape describing a black male carrying 
a gun had been admitted into evidence: 
 
       Here, the only admissible evidence linking Sallins to the 
possession 
       of a gun was circumstantial evidence conveyed through the 
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We said in Miller v. Keating, 754 F .2d 507 (3d Cir. 1985): 
 
       The unifying trait of all the Rule 803 exceptions is a 
       circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness sufficient 
       to justify nonproduction of the declarant, whether 
       available or not. Although Rule 806 cannot be r ead to 
       confer a right to any particular form of attack on the 
       credibility of a hearsay declarant, it does confer a 
       generalized right that is significantly diminished when 
       the hearsay declarant is not only unavailable, but is 
       also unidentified, and the party against whom the 
       hearsay declarant's statement is introduced is thus 
       deprived not only of the right to cross-examine, but of 
       any meaningful prospect of finding evidence of 
       inconsistency or bias. 
 
Id. at 510 (footnote omitted). We then noted, as the majority 
here does concede, that where the declarant is not 
identified, the party seeking to introduce such a statement 
carries a "heavier" burden to demonstrate the statement's 
"circumstantial trustworthiness." Id.  at 510. 
 
In Miller, there was no question as to whether the 
startling occasion occurred. Rather, the issue was whether 
the proponent of the testimony established the declarant's 
personal knowledge and the statement's spontaneity. Id. 
Here, the issue is whether the gun-waving incident ever 
really happened and, other than the officer's self-serving 
statement that the defendant in fact was holding the gun, 
there is no evidence that the incident in fact occurred. 
There is no evidence of "cir cumstantial trustworthiness," let 
alone evidence to satisfy a "heavier" bur den. Id. at 511. 
 
In the circumstances presented her e, I would find that 
Officer Hughes' testimony concerning the purported 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       testimony of Officers Santiago and Howard. . . . Because the 
officers' 
       testimony was hotly contested, we cannot say with any degree of 
       certainty that the evidence of the police radio call and the 911 
       computer record did not contribute to the jury's verdict. The 
       evidence cemented the government's case by adding an invisible, 
       presumably disinterested witness who allegedly saw precisely what 
       the police said they saw. 
 
Id. at 348 (emphasis added). 
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statement by the unidentified declarants was insufficient to 
establish the hearsay statement's own admissibility. On 
this record, Hughes' testimony constitutes"scant[ ]" 
evidence that the startling event actually occurr ed; it lacked 
"sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness" to provide the 
basis for the admission of the hearsay statement as an 
excited utterance. Miller, 754 F.2d at 510. 
 
I think the District Court admitted a hearsay statement 
that "proved" more than was in fact proven. In a criminal 
case such as this, where the defense theory seeks to 
undercut the very trustworthiness of the gover nment's 
version of events, we should not admit hearsay that proves 
the government's case if the reliability of the statement is 
questionable. Otherwise, the exception swallows the rule, 
as, I think, happened here. 
 
Also, the prosecutor's closing remarks r egarding the 
evidence's being "uncontested" take on a very different, 
more prejudicial, quality when unconfir med yet 
incontrovertible hearsay is the government's central 
evidence in the case. 
 
I do not believe that these errors were harmless, and I 
would reverse and require a new trial. 
 
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
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